

# Do Russian Police Fabricate Drug Offenses? Evidence From Seized Heroin's Weight Distribution

Journal of Drug Issues  
2020, Vol. 50(4) 378–391  
© The Author(s) 2020  
Article reuse guidelines:  
sagepub.com/journals-permissions  
DOI: 10.1177/0022042620918951  
journals.sagepub.com/home/jod



Alex Knorre<sup>1,2</sup> 

## Abstract

Current Russian drug policy is punitive toward people who use drugs. Moreover, criminal justice in Russia is driven by strong organizational incentives to increase performance indicators of police such as clearance rate. Taken together, these might lead to the use of extrajudicial and illegal police practices, as documented by several qualitative studies. In this article, we explore quantitative evidence of such practices, namely, weight anomalies of the seized heroin that result from minimum threshold amounts established by the law. We find significant discontinuities in the weight distribution of seized heroin near minimum threshold amounts. Placebo tests rule out alternative explanations of the discontinuity and show that the most likely source of the revealed discontinuities is police manipulations with seized heroin.

## Keywords

drug offenses, drug enforcement, police corruption

## Introduction

At the end of September 2018, a trial had taken place in the Tosno district court, Leningrad region, Russia. Several police officers were indicted with fabricating evidence. They were alleged of planting drugs on a man. To do so, they had forced Aleksei, a 22-year-old person who had already been charged with a drug offense, to find someone who could buy some narcotics. The officers threatened to detain him in case of his refusal to cooperate. Aleksei managed to find an appropriate acquaintance, a cook from a nearby restaurant, who agreed to buy some hash. The police officers demanded that Aleksei plant 2 g of amphetamines, so the police could immediately arrest the cook. Instead of actual amphetamine, Aleksei used powdered chloropyramine (harmless antihistamine) pills. The police detained the cook with the pack of cigarettes that contained, according to the initial forensic examination, 2.47 g of amphetamines. Later operatives of the Federal Security Service arrested the officers and used tasers for torture to get the confession of guilt (MediaZona, 2018).

The story illustrates one of the illicit methods, planting evidence, that Russian police officers might use to initiate drug-related criminal cases in Russia. Although the scale of drug-related police misconduct is unknown, the possibility of its widespread usage aligns well with what is

<sup>1</sup>European University at Saint Petersburg, Russian Federation

<sup>2</sup>University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA

## Corresponding Author:

Alex Knorre, Institute for the Rule of Law, European University at Saint Petersburg, 6/1 Gagarinskaya Street, Saint Petersburg 191187, Russian Federation.

Email: [aknorre@eu.spb.ru](mailto:aknorre@eu.spb.ru)

known about modern drug policy in Russia. It has moral panic at its core. Russian government employs drug policy to propagate conservative ideology and its “traditional values” inside the country (Marshall, 2014; Sarang, 2017). Russian officials view both the decriminalization of drug consumption and harm reduction strategy as geopolitical threats and a way for the Western countries to destabilize Russia (Galeotti, 2016, 2017). Drugs are viewed as symbolic polluters of the country, thus directly affecting public attitudes and methods toward people who use drugs both in the public health and criminal justice systems (Meylakhs, 2009). It results in current Russian drug policy being inefficient, failing to address drug-related public health issues, and repressing and prosecuting large amounts of people who use drugs.

From a public health perspective, treatment of people with drug addiction in Russia is governed by a state-dependent discipline of narcology that opposes substitution therapy, which is argued to be highly cost-efficient compared with current methods (Idrisov et al., 2017). Narcology regards detoxification from drugs as the only way to end drug addiction and is completely isolated from the current research on drug addiction (Elovich & Drucker, 2008). Moreover, the current drug control policy is known to lead to systematical human rights violations (Golichenko & Chu, 2018). Possibly, one of the most devastating results is the HIV epidemic. Russia reports a steady annual increase of people infected with HIV, and approximately every 1 out of 146 Russians is HIV-positive as of 2018 (UNAIDS Data Book, 2018). With the growing number of HIV-positive people, almost half of all new diagnoses come from people who inject drugs (Beyrer et al., 2017).

Drug-related criminal justice is another problematic issue in Russian drug policy. The ideology behind the drug treatment and accompanying attitude toward people who use drugs result in repressive policing methods. People who inject heroin in Russia experience significant tension when encountering the police (Sarang et al., 2010). Moreover, the police sometimes employ a variety of extrajudicial and illicit ways to deal with people who use drugs, such as arrests without a legal basis, planting of evidence, money extortion, and physical violence (Sarang et al., 2010). Comparable results come from a study of people who have heroin addiction in Ukraine, depicting a vicious circle of addiction, treatment, and criminal justice related to current drug enforcement policy (Mazhnaya et al., 2016). A similar tension between the police and people who use drugs has come forward during the substitution therapy experiment in China, rendering the role of police attitudes toward people who use drugs even after the introduction of harm reduction policy (Ma et al., 2016). Research into American drug-related offenses shows that police perception of the “usual suspects,” with its inherent bias toward stigmatized groups, defines organizational practices in the police, which in turn result in racial disparities (Beckett et al., 2006).

From the criminal justice perspective, Russian drug policy has also shown its repressiveness. Russia has both one of the largest prison population and incarceration rates in the world, 402 prisoners per 100,000 of the national population (World Prison Brief, 2018). Subsequently, current Russian drug policy has resulted in a high number of people sentenced to prison for drug offenses: It constitutes 136,000 people or 26% of all Russian prison population as of 2017 (Federal Penitentiary Service of the Russian Federation, 2018).

These figures can be explained through the design of the criminal justice system in Russia. It is a severely biased neo-inquisitorial system, with the dominant role of police investigators and severely restricted possibilities for judges to acquit defendants (Solomon, 2015). Criminal courts in Russia have a strong accusatorial bias (less than a percent of the accused are acquitted), as the investigating detective is not neutral and has a strong organizational interest in punishment as an outcome of a trial. On the side of judges, acquittals are extremely rare, as they serve as an indicator of the poor performance of the whole criminal justice system. The whole criminal justice system in Russia functions like an assembly line that indicts, convicts, and sentences a large number of people in a relatively short time. The work of all agents in law enforcement—the

police, prosecutors, and judges—is evaluated through performance indicators, a system of internal control also known as “quota system” that is extensively used to assess the work of law enforcement actors.

Ella Paneyakh provides an excellent analysis of the causes of widespread usage of the “quota system” in Russian criminal justice. Courts, prosecutors, and police, as well as other law enforcement entities, are extremely centralized. They lack external controls (such as public evaluation in the form of surveys or electoral institutions for judges or police chiefs) and instead rely on the internal forms of control. These usually mean regular (monthly, quarterly, yearly) statistical reports on different levels of hierarchy (police stations, municipalities, regions) about average caseload for the unit, number of processed cases, the structure of the caseload, and “clearance rate,” or “ratio of cases passed through to the next stages of the sentencing process to cases received or accepted for processing” (Paneyakh, 2014, p. 125). These figures are used to comparatively assess police units on the same level of the hierarchy, thus effectively creating a rating of units who work better or worse. Failure to “hit the numbers” results in punishments, thus creating incentives to selectively investigate cases that are the easiest and require less time and resources, and that are considered to be more severe about potential punishment for an offender (as they are evaluated more highly). It also pushes law enforcement agents to exploit opportunities that can save time in pressing charges prosecution, which include aggressive negotiation techniques with suspects, standardizing paperwork, and falsification of legal documents. One of the common techniques to lower the processing costs for police, prosecutors, and courts are to a suspect to plead guilty. This removes the necessity to review the proofs of guilt and enable police to fast-track the case to court. State-sponsored defense attorneys are instrumental in this (Moiseeva, 2017).

However, some cases might not be easy despite all the techniques. Such difficult cases can be pushed through by “faking evidence, unlawful pressure on witnesses, and torture” bias (Paneyakh, 2014; Paneyakh et al., 2018). The story of Ivan Golunov, a Russian journalist who has been planted cocaine by police due to his investigations in 2019, is a famous example of such a push. As the police do not need a victim to initiate a drug-related criminal case, drug policing can be especially prone to using illicit techniques to maintain a sustainable level of cleared drug crimes, which constitutes the corruption “in search of legitimate goals” (Carter, 1990).

To sum up, the entire configuration of Russian drug policy, together with its ideology, policing practices, and design of the criminal justice system, might result in the use of illegal or extrajudicial drug policing practices to achieve performance indicators. However, these practices ought to leave traces inside the administrative data on drug offenses. As a proxy of performance indicators, we use minimum threshold amounts for the weight of seized drugs that define the boundaries for the prosecution of drug offenses.

### *Legal Framework of Drug-Related Offenses and Minimum Threshold Amounts in Russia*

The Criminal Code of the Russian Federation has a range of articles criminalizing drug-related activities. However, two types of offenses account for 95% of all drug-related crimes in the country: drug possession for personal use (Article 228) and drug trafficking (Article 228.1) (Knorre & Skougarevskiy, 2015, p. 10). The difference is subtle but significant for both an offender and the police, as these articles prescribe different penalties. Article 228 accounts for illegal drug possession without an intent to sell, and Article 228.1 punishes for drug distribution and trafficking (Legislationline, 2012). Drug trafficking has a wide legal definition: According to the criminal court practice established by the Supreme Court’s Decree (“Postanovlenie,” 2006), drug trafficking includes the sharing of drug substances free of charge, so even people who just share a joint of marijuana with their friends can be convicted of drug trafficking.

The quantity of drugs seized during the arrest of a suspect is crucial in determining the subsequent legal track. There are minimum thresholds for every drug type, which both establish the weight necessary for initiating a criminal case and sometimes trigger more severe punishment. These thresholds are comprised of three types for every drug substance: significant, large, and extra-large amounts. That being said, some arrests of people who possessed drugs for personal use might end up being misdemeanors (according to the Administrative Code of Russia) if the weight of seized drugs does not exceed the significant threshold amount. The government defines minimum threshold amounts in a special decree (“Ob utverzhdenii,” 2014); their summary is available in Table 1.

Interestingly, these amounts do not seem to be based on any type of publicly available research. The detailed history of their emergence is yet to be described. However, it is known that the main author of the thresholds is Eduard Babayan, famous Soviet narcologist who later in the 1990s became the head of Regular Drug Control Committee, a nongovernmental organization in Russia with unclear judicial status. The resolutions of the Committee about the illegality of various substances and the thresholds were used for government legislation of illegal drugs. Initially, the threshold amounts were extremely small: For example, any quantity of heroin or 0.1 g of marijuana was enough to open a criminal case against a drug user. In 2004, the thresholds were changed towards the upper bound (with 1 g of heroin or 20 g of marijuana used to be a minimum threshold for drug use offense). In 2006, there were slightly decreased and have not been changed since then (Elovich & Drucker, 2008; Levinson, 2008).

The direct comparison of the severity of the minimum thresholds in Russia with other countries is troublesome due to differences in the legal interpretations of the thresholds: Some countries measure the active substance, others general weight of the seized mixture, and often a judicial or police discretion is used to determine whether criminal charges should be pressed. However, a crude comparison shows that, for heroin, Russia has lower threshold (0.5 g) than Spain (3 g), Portugal (1 g), Paraguay (2 g), or Czech Republic (1.5 g); the only country that has an even lower threshold is Mexico, with 0.05 g (TalkingDrugs, 2019).

For drug offenses, legally established minimum threshold amounts present a quasi-experimental setting to discover artificial sorting. In this setting, one can expect to find manipulations with drug weight, as sufficient drug weight is required to initiate a criminal case and/or define the severity of the offense. In other words, if the distribution of drug weights is discontinuous around the thresholds, then drug weights are manipulated. Numerous studies show that people sometimes manipulate with various types of metric indicators in the same fashion: Teachers manipulate exam scores to move high school graduates over performance thresholds (Dee et al., 2016; Diamond & Persson, 2016); self-employed people in the United States misreport their income to evade taxes (Saez, 2010); police officers lower indicated speed in speeding tickets due to racial disparity (Goncalves & Mello, 2017). The study of the discontinuity (bunching) in the punishment cliffs near the mandatory minimums for drug offenses in the United States is one of the few contributions that is similar in spirit to this work (Tuttle, 2017). Tuttle observes bunching at and above the thresholds where punishment for drug offenses increases. He explains it through racial discrimination in prosecutorial discretion. Prosecutors can decide whether to include drug quantities indicated in witness testimonies or not. Racial characteristics of the suspects influence these decisions, which results in the discontinuous distribution of drug weight. Our research employs the design similar to Tuttle’s but with one important difference. From a legal viewpoint, there can be no discretion with regard to the quantity of drugs, as it is established by forensic examination in Russia. Thus, discontinuity in drug weights would result either from the actions of people who use or possess drugs or from the police, thus proving the existence of deliberate decision-making related to weights of seized drugs. To test the weight distribution of seized drugs for discontinuity near the thresholds, we employ a density discontinuity test (Cattaneo et al., 2017a; McCrary, 2008) and use data on seized heroin, which we describe in the following section.

**Table 1.** Minimum Threshold Amounts for Drug-Related Prosecution in Russia (as of 2014).

Type of drug crime		Misdemeanor		Offense	
		—		Significant amount	Large amount
Minimum threshold amount	Marijuana	<6 g	>6 g	>100 g	>100 kg
	Heroin	<0.5 g	>0.5 g	>2.5 g	>1 kg
	Hash	<2 g	>2 g	>25 g	>10 kg
Punishment for drug possession		A fine or conditional imprisonment	0.1–3 years in prison	3–10 years in prison	>10 years in prison

## Data and Method

### *Data: The Universe of All Drug Offenses With Seized Heroin in Russia for 2 Years*

We use data from the universe of all crimes registered in the Russian Federation. The data come from a unified database of all statistical cards on registered crimes across the country maintained by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation. The Institute for the Rule of Law at the European University at Saint Petersburg was granted access to depersonalized (anonymous) records (over 5-million observations) of the database for 2013–2014. The statistical cards are official documents that are used to track the process of criminal investigations. They are filled by police officers who initiate criminal cases. Each statistical card contains many fields, among others, unique case identifier, the agency that registered the crime, the nature of the offense (according to the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation), and quantity and types of seized drugs (determined by results of a laboratory examination in case the police seized any drugs). In this article, we rely on the data from statistical cards used in the first stage of a criminal investigation, its initiation, representing the universe of all drug-related criminal proceedings during 2 years in the country. However, these statistical cards do not represent all the crimes, as the police may not register some of them due to low reporting or strategic reasons (Biderman & Reiss, 1967; Shklyaruk & Skougarevskiy, 2015). This is particularly true for drug offenses, as there are no victims ready to report a crime. Moreover, many events where the police managed to arrest a person with drugs do not end up being registered due to bribery. In the case of Russia, there are no estimates of such events, but nonrepresentative study into drug-related bribes to the police suggests that it can be a widespread practice (Sarang et al., 2017).

From the universe of all offenses registered in Russia during 2013–2014, we subset all criminal records related to two types of drug offenses—drug possession (Article 228 of the Criminal Code) and drug trafficking (Article 228.1 of the Criminal Code)—and obtain 382,036 observations of every single seized drug, given the record contained both drug type and its quantity.

Almost a third of all statistical cards for drug offenses contains blank records for either drug type or its quantity, which have been removed from the dataset. In our previous research, we have shown these missing data are randomly distributed across law enforcement agencies and regions, and should not bias the results (Knorre & Skougarevskiy, 2015).

Then, we select only the crimes registered by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which accounts for 64% of all drug offenses. The Federal Service for Drug Enforcement of the Russian Federation accounts for 35%, and other law enforcement agencies, such as the Federal Customs Service, account for the remaining 0.4% (Knorre & Skougarevskiy, 2015, p. 10). We do it for two reasons.

First, the Federal Service for Drug Enforcement was disbanded in 2015. Second, both the regular police and the Federal Service for Drug Enforcement were similar in terms of seized drug structure, as previous research shows (Knorre & Skougarevskiy, 2015).

Heroin constitutes 21% of all seized drugs across these offenses, and we focus on this drug only for several reasons. First, heroin is the only drug measured in milligrams in the data. It also has minimum threshold amounts that are close to each other and therefore enable one to see discontinuities on the fine-grained scale of weight distribution. Second, as we have argued above, people who inject heroin is a comparatively well-studied group of people who use drugs. Third, this group is known to be most vulnerable to drug-related police misconduct in Russia.

After the aforementioned data preprocessing, the dataset consists of 26,617 heroin seizures of drug possession and 27,594 records of drug trafficking. We then create three subsets of these data. Subset A consists of drug possession offenses with observations near the large threshold amount (2.5 g), where we cut values below 0.5 g and above the 95% percentile (12 g). Subsets B and C consist of drug trafficking offenses with observations near the significant and large threshold amounts (0.5 and 2.5 g). For subset B, we remove values above 2.5 g and those which weight is equal to zero. Finally, we remove values below 0.5 g and above the 99% percentile (24 g) for the subset C. The rationale behind removing the tails of weight distribution in subsets is twofold. First, we focus on the observations that do not cross other threshold amounts. Second, we cut the upper tails of distributions to make groups of observations both above and below thresholds balanced, which is important for bandwidth estimation in our density test.


### *Method: Density Test From Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD)*

We employ the density test developed by Justin McCrary to assess the discontinuity of the distribution of heroin's weight (McCrary, 2008). Originally, the test emerged as a specification check for RDD. In an RDD, manipulation of an outcome variable violates one of the identifying assumptions of the estimator. This manipulation can arise for many reasons, one being public knowledge about the threshold. In that case, the agents might self-sort into the below-the-threshold and above-the-threshold groups, rendering the crucial assumption on random assignment to these groups invalid. To test for such sorting, McCrary proposed a density test that produces a probability of rejecting a null hypothesis on the discontinuity near the threshold.

Initial implementation of the test by McCrary uses local linear density estimator. First, it aggregates the outcome variable into bins, producing a histogram. Afterward, it fits two local polynomials (one below the threshold and the other above) with midpoints of the bins serving as the regressor and height of each bin (i.e., the number of observations aggregated into each bin) as the dependent variable. Then, estimated parameters are passed to the Wald test, which either rejects or accepts the null hypothesis.

However, to use McCrary test one needs to set the parameters: bandwidth (window width to include observations neat the cutoff value) and bin width. The choice is usually data-driven and needs robustness checks. Thus, we use the latest implementation of the density test by Cattaneo et al. (2017b) that employs a local polynomial density estimator. The main advantage of this implementation is that it only requires a bandwidth parameter, which is selected automatically through asymptotic mean squared error expansion. The implementation is available in both R and Stata (Cattaneo et al., 2017a).

Apart from the density test itself, we also proceed with the placebo test to do a falsification analysis. The idea behind the placebo test is to iteratively change the cutoff. It allows us to check whether there are discontinuities of the outcome variable on various parts of a distribution (Cattaneo et al., 2018).



**Figure 1.** The histogram of weight distribution of heroin seized by Russian police in 2013–2014.  
*Note.* The width of each bar is 100 mg.

## Results


However elusive and hard to prove it might be, evidence suggesting drug-related police manipulations with drugs could be detected in the administrative data on drug arrests. Figure 1 shows the weight distribution of all heroin seized by Russian police in 2013–2014.

There is an apparent anomaly in Figure 1: There are peaks of heroin-related criminal cases just above the minimum threshold amounts. While one could expect a monotonous distribution of heroin weight, the data show that it is discontinuous. A large proportion of people who were arrested for heroin possession or trafficking had quantities that are situated just near threshold amounts. In other words, we observe that legally established minimums that define an applicable part of the criminal article and subsequent punishment are somehow related to the weight of heroin seized by police. The discontinuity near all three minimum threshold amounts is statistically significant, as density tests show (Figure 2). We also report the results of the placebo test in Appendices A and B.

These results suggest that there is sorting, or manipulation, that influences how much heroin is seized by police, and, subsequently, creates a discontinuity in the data. Large (2.5 g) threshold amounts for both heroin possession and heroin trafficking arrests show the strongest and the most prolonged effects of manipulation. For these amounts, the placebo test reports discontinuities inside regions above the threshold with a length of approximately 0.7 to 1 g.

## Discussion

Discontinuity test confirms that there is ubiquitous manipulation with seized heroin weight in drug offenses. A straightforward yet naïve way to explain the manipulation is by the behavior of people who use drugs. The police arrest them with the exact or slightly exceeding the quantity of heroin needed for the convenient determination of their offenses according to the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. In other words, people who use drugs are accustomed to possess and



**Figure 2.** Density plots for weight distributions of heroin seized by Russian police in 2013–2014 near thresholds.

Note. Gray and red lines represent fitted local quadratic polynomials. Shaded regions are 95% confidence interval calculated through fitted local cubic polynomials. The difference in parameters below and above a threshold is significant even when confidence intervals overlap.

sell heroin in amounts that are feasible for the police to seize and use as evidence during the investigation.

However, this argument is highly implausible. First, the single average dose of street-level heroin in Russia as of 2002 is reported to be around 0.1 g (Paoli, 2002). European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (2019) reports the typical street dose of heroin around 100 mg. A study of Australian heroin-related arrest corroborates this, with 92 mg as the median weight of seized heroin (Stam et al., 2018). This suggests that the center of weight distribution for heroin, at least for common users, would be below 0.5 g.

Second, from the perspective of the economic approach to crime, criminals are rational agents and therefore always try to reduce the cost of crime (Becker, 1968). Thus, if there was such behavior, the peaks of seized heroin's weight would be situated below the threshold amounts, not above. This logic holds both for drug dealers and for people who buy heroin. For heroin dealers, police can employ entrapment, or "buy-bust" operations, posing as buyers to entrap heroin dealers and asking for the quantity of heroin slightly above one of the threshold amounts. Nevertheless, drug markets are highly adaptive for these risks, and even the quantity should have become a sign of possible entrapment (Aitken et al., 2002).

The unusual number of heroin possession charges above the threshold further suggests the existence of police manipulations with seized heroin's weight. For some reason, these people carried the exact amount of heroin—from 2.5 to 3 g—for the police to initiate a severe criminal case of heroin possession. At the same time, much fewer offenders possessed quantities below the large threshold for heroin possession (2.5 g).

The exploratory nature of our research does not allow making a causal inference about the discontinuity of heroin weight and police misconduct. However, the revealed discontinuities cannot be reasonably explained by anything else than police manipulation with seized drugs. Using Carter's (1990) framework of drug-related police corruption, we can think of two models of police behavior that explains the discontinuity. The first one is a corruption for personal profit, also known as Type 1 corruption. Police officers might leave minimal weight needed for laboratory examination and subsequent prosecution while selling the surplus or using it for other personal purposes.

However, Type 2 corruption, that is, corruption driven by organizational incentives, seems more plausible given the low acquittal rate and strong incentives to hit the numbers for the criminal justice system in Russia. Law enforcement agencies are required to fill the quotas of registered and cleared crimes, with different quotas for different types of the severity of offenses. As for drug offenses, the severity of a drug offense depends on the nature of offenses (whether it is possession or trafficking), and on the weight of the seized drug. Therefore, weight "peaks" of drug offenses in the data may indicate that sometimes police officers might use extrajudicial (such as entrapment) or even illicit practices (such as planting evidence) to guarantee registration and clearance of drug-related criminal cases. The two explanations are not mutually exclusive, so in reality, we might expect to see various combinations of these mechanisms. For example, the police might force people who use drugs to pay bribes and fabricate drug offenses for those who refuse.

These findings provide new insights into the inner-workings of a drug-related criminal justice system and its interrelation with repressive drug policies. Furthermore, this study provides yet another evidence against the police-centered approach in drug enforcement as opposed to harm reduction and decriminalization: Dealing with drug use with criminal punishment not only harms people who use drugs but might also generate police misconduct and reinforce illegal practices of drug policing. However, the bunching effect of seized heroin in this study is an average on the national level in Russia. The severity and scale of drug-related police misconduct might vary with different regions and police stations, depending on the local prevalence of heroin use, the integrity of chief of police and police officers, and other factors. Thus, the findings do not allow to say that the extent of drug-related police manipulations in Russia is the same in every part of the country. However, they strongly suggest that such manipulations are widespread. Future comparative research with similar design could uncover similar bunching near minimum threshold amounts in other post-Soviet countries that share many features of the current Russian criminal justice system and compare weight distributions of seized heroin in other countries with the one found in this article.

## Appendix A

Results of the Placebo Test on the Subset of Heroin Possession Arrests.

Cutoff value	Bandwidth (left)	Bandwidth (right)	<i>p</i> value	Sign.
1.2	0.21	0.21	.295	-
1.3	0.22	0.22	.804	-
1.4	0.21	0.21	.607	-
1.5	0.2	0.2	.102	-
1.6	0.2	0.21	.127	-
1.7	0.22	0.22	.254	-
1.8	0.23	0.23	.186	-
1.9	0.25	0.25	.319	-
2	0.28	0.29	.512	-
2.1	0.33	0.33	.326	-
2.2	0.38	0.39	.039	+
2.3	0.49	0.51	.116	-
2.4	0.72	0.83	.012	+
<b>2.5</b>	<b>1.52</b>	<b>1.18</b>	<b>&lt;.001</b>	<b>+</b>
2.6	0.83	1.04	<.001	+
2.7	1.76	1.3	<.001	+
2.8	0.71	0.81	.848	-
2.9	0.61	0.66	.296	-
3	0.67	0.73	.677	-
3.1	1.08	1.34	<.001	+
3.2	0.68	0.74	.035	+
3.3	0.48	0.5	.404	-
3.4	0.4	0.41	.919	-
3.5	0.36	0.37	.794	-
3.6	0.33	0.34	.197	-
3.7	0.32	0.32	.169	-
3.8	0.31	0.31	.276	-
3.9	0.3	0.3	.371	-
4	0.29	0.29	.571	-
4.1	0.29	0.29	.714	-
4.2	0.29	0.29	.641	-
4.3	0.29	0.29	.63	-
4.4	0.29	0.29	.345	-
4.5	0.29	0.29	.237	-

Note. The large threshold amount is bolded.

## Appendix B

Results of the Placebo Test on the Subset of Heroin Trafficking Arrests.

Significant amount (0.5 g)					Large amount (2.5 g)				
Cutoff value	Bandwidth (left)	Bandwidth (right)	<i>p</i> value	Sign.	Cutoff value	Bandwidth (left)	Bandwidth (right)	<i>p</i> value	Sign.
0.1	0.02	0.02	<.001	+	1	0.19	0.19	.502	-
0.2	0.23	0.19	.018	+	1.1	0.19	0.19	.028	+
0.3	0.06	0.05	.114	-	1.2	0.2	0.2	.352	-

(continued)

**Appendix B (continued)**

Significant amount (0.5 g)					Large amount (2.5 g)				
Cutoff value	Bandwidth (left)	Bandwidth (right)	p value	Sign.	Cutoff value	Bandwidth (left)	Bandwidth (right)	p value	Sign.
0.4	0.08	0.07	.179	–	1.3	0.19	0.19	.804	–
<b>0.5</b>	<b>0.13</b>	<b>0.1</b>	<b>.005</b>	+	1.4	0.19	0.19	.723	–
0.6	0.12	0.11	.256	–	1.5	0.18	0.18	.894	–
0.7	0.2	0.19	.86	–	1.6	0.18	0.18	.994	–
0.8	0.17	0.16	.423	–	1.7	0.19	0.19	.927	–
0.9	0.13	0.11	.393	–	1.8	0.2	0.2	.075	–
1	0.11	0.11	.045	+	1.9	0.22	0.21	.922	–
1.1	0.12	0.11	.11	–	2	0.25	0.24	.768	–
1.2	0.29	0.38	.272	–	2.1	0.29	0.29	.634	–
1.3	0.14	0.14	.254	–	2.2	0.37	0.36	.003	+
1.4	0.18	0.17	.857	–	2.3	0.67	0.57	.245	–
1.5	0.22	0.17	.919	–	2.4	0.86	0.59	.022	+
1.6	0.22	0.19	.948	–	<b>2.5</b>	<b>0.5</b>	<b>0.43</b>	<b>.01</b>	+
1.7	0.33	0.29	.137	–	2.6	0.44	0.39	.505	–
1.8	0.29	0.4	.091	–	2.7	0.45	0.39	.725	–
1.9	0.18	0.15	.339	–	2.8	0.47	0.42	.492	–
2	0.14	0.2	.367	–	2.9	0.48	0.45	.003	+
2.1	0.15	0.2	.452	–	3	0.48	0.46	.039	+
2.2	0.1	0.1	.749	–	3.1	0.47	0.46	.042	+
2.3	0.09	0.09	.403	–	3.2	0.43	0.42	<.001	+
2.4	0.05	0.05	.924	–	3.3	0.38	0.38	.001	+
					3.4	0.35	0.35	.094	–
					3.5	0.33	0.33	.317	–
					3.6	0.31	0.31	.979	–
					3.7	0.3	0.3	.576	–
					3.8	0.29	0.29	.228	–
					3.9	0.29	0.28	.299	–
					4	0.29	0.28	.21	–

Note. Significant and large threshold amounts are bolded.

**Declaration of Conflicting Interests**

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

**Funding**

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This research was supported by the Russian Science Foundation Grant [17-18-01681].

**ORCID iD**

Alex Knorre  <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5079-9573>

## References

- Aitken, C., Moore, D., Higgs, P., Kelsall, J., & Kerger, M. (2002). The impact of a police crackdown on a street drug scene: Evidence from the street. *International Journal of Drug Policy*, 13(3), 189–198. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0955-3959\(02\)00075-0](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0955-3959(02)00075-0)
- Becker, G. S. (1968). Crime and punishment: An economic approach. *Journal of Political Economy*, 76(2), 169–217.
- Beckett, K., Nyrop, K., & Pflingst, L. (2006). Race, drugs, and policing: Understanding disparities in drug delivery arrests. *Criminology*, 44(1), 105–137. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-9125.2006.00044.x>
- Beyrer, C., Wirtz, A. L., O'Hara, G., Léon, N., & Kazatchkine, M. (2017). The expanding epidemic of HIV-1 in the Russian Federation. *PLOS Medicine*, 14(11), Article e1002462. <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1002462>
- Biderman, A. D., & Reiss, A. J. (1967). On exploring the “dark figure” of crime. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 374(1), 1–15.
- Carter, D. L. (1990). Drug-related corruption of police officers: A contemporary typology. *Journal of Criminal Justice*, 18(2), 85–98. [https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2352\(90\)90028-A](https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2352(90)90028-A)
- Cattaneo, M. D., Idrobo, N., & Titiunik, R. (2018). *A practical introduction to regression discontinuity designs* (Vol. 1, p.116). Cambridge University Press.
- Cattaneo, M. D., Jansson, M., & Ma, X. (2017a). *rddensity: Manipulation testing based on density discontinuity*. <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/4523/c0a6b2d7c9a802bdbff4941263181701a659.pdf>
- Cattaneo, M. D., Jansson, M., & Ma, X. (2017b). Simple local polynomial density estimators. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*. Advance online publication. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01621459.2019.1635480>
- Dee, T., Dobbie, W., Jacob, B., & Rockoff, J. (2016). *The causes and consequences of test score manipulation: Evidence from the New York regents examinations* (No. w22165). National Bureau of Economic Research. <https://doi.org/10.3386/w22165>
- Diamond, R., & Persson, P. (2016). *The long-term consequences of teacher discretion in grading of high-stakes tests* (No. w22207). National Bureau of Economic Research. <https://doi.org/10.3386/w22207>
- Elovich, R., & Drucker, E. (2008). On drug treatment and social control: Russian narcology's great leap backwards. *Harm Reduction Journal*, 5, Article 23. <https://doi.org/10.1186/1477-7517-5-23>
- European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction. (2019). *Heroin drug profile*. [http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/publications/drug-profiles/heroin\\_en](http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/publications/drug-profiles/heroin_en)
- Federal Penitentiary Service of the Russian Federation. (2018, February 14). *Characteristics of adult prison population in Russia*. <http://fsin.su/structure/inspector/iao/statistika/Xar-ka%20lic%20sodergahix-sya%20v%20IK/>
- Galeotti, M. (2016). *Narcotics and nationalism: Russian drug policies and futures*. <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Galeotti-Russia-final.pdf>
- Galeotti, M. (2017). Securitizing narcotics: The politics and prospects of Russian counterdrug policies. *Journal of Drug Policy Analysis*, 10(1), Article 20150010. <https://doi.org/10.1515/jdpa-2015-0010>
- Golichenko, M., & Chu, S. K. H. (2018). Human rights in patient care: Drug treatment and punishment in Russia. *Public Health Reviews*, 39(1), Article 12. <https://doi.org/10.1186/s40985-018-0088-5>
- Goncalves, F., & Mello, S. (2017). *A few bad apples? Racial bias in policing* [Working paper]. <http://dataspace.princeton.edu/jspui/handle/88435/dsp01z890rw746>
- Idrisov, B., Murphy, S. M., Morrill, T., Saadoun, M., Lunze, K., & Shepard, D. (2017). Implementation of methadone therapy for opioid use disorder in Russia—A modeled cost-effectiveness analysis. *Substance Abuse Treatment, Prevention, and Policy*, 12(1), Article 4. <https://doi.org/10.1186/s13011-016-0087-9>
- Knorre, A., & Skougarevskiy, D. (2015). *Kak MVD i FSKN borjutsja s narkotikami: Sravnitel'nyj analiz rezul'tativnosti dvuh vedomstv*. Institute for the Rule of Law, European University at St. Petersburg. [http://enforce.spb.ru/images/analit\\_zapiski/FSKN\\_MVD\\_memo\\_2015\\_web.pdf](http://enforce.spb.ru/images/analit_zapiski/FSKN_MVD_memo_2015_web.pdf)
- Legislationline. (2012). *The criminal code of the Russian Federation*. [https://www.legislationline.org/download/action/download/id/4247/file/RF\\_CC\\_1996\\_am03.2012\\_en.pdf](https://www.legislationline.org/download/action/download/id/4247/file/RF_CC_1996_am03.2012_en.pdf)
- Levinson, L. (2008). Half a gram—A thousand lives. *Harm Reduction Journal*, 5, Article 22. <https://doi.org/10.1186/1477-7517-5-22>

- Ma, Y., Du, C., Cai, T., Han, Q., Yuan, H., Luo, T., Ren, G., Mburu, G., Wang, B., Golichenko, O., & Zhang, C. (2016). Barriers to community-based drug dependence treatment: Implications for police roles, collaborations and performance indicators. *Journal of the International AIDS Society*, 19(4 Suppl. 3), Article 20879.
- Marshall, A. (2014, July). *From drug war to culture war: Russia's growing role in the global drug debate* [Research reports or papers]. <https://www.swansea.ac.uk/media/From-drug-war-to-culture-war-Russia's-growing-role-in-the-global-drug-debate.pdf>
- Mazhnaya, A., Bojko, M. J., Marcus, R., Filippovych, S., Islam, Z., Dvoriak, S., & Altice, F. L. (2016). In their own voices: Breaking the vicious cycle of addiction, treatment and criminal justice among people who inject drugs in Ukraine. *Drugs*, 23(2), 163–175. <https://doi.org/10.3109/09687637.2015.1127327>
- McCrary, J. (2008). Manipulation of the running variable in the regression discontinuity design: A density test. *Journal of Econometrics*, 142(2), 698–714. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconom.2007.05.005>
- MediaZona. (2018, September 21). *Zaderzhivali politseiskogo—razryadili dva elektroskokera* [Two tasers were depleted during an arrest of the police officer]. <https://zona.media/article/2018/09/21/tosno>
- Meylakhs, P. (2009). Drugs and symbolic pollution: The work of cultural logic in the Russian press. *Cultural Sociology*, 3(3), 377–395. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1749975509105538>
- Moiseeva, E. (2017). Plea bargaining in Russia: The role of defence attorneys and the problem of asymmetry. *International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice*, 41(3), 163–184. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01924036.2016.1233441>
- “Ob utverzhenii znachitel'nogo, krupnogo i osobo krupnogo razmera narkoticheskikh vestschestv. . .” The Decree by the Government of the Russian Federation №1002. (2014). <http://pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?docbody=&nd=102159762&rdk=11>
- Paneyakh, E. (2014). Faking performance together: Systems of performance evaluation in Russian enforcement agencies and production of bias and privilege. *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 30(2–3), 115–136. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2013.858525>
- Paneyakh, E., Titaev, K., & Shklyaruk, M. (2018). *Traektoriya ugolovnogo dela: institutsional'nyi analiz* [Criminal case trajectory: an institutional analysis]. European University at Saint Petersburg.
- Paoli, L. (2002). The development of an illegal market: Drug consumption and trade in post-soviet Russia. *The British Journal of Criminology*, 42(1), 21–39.
- “Postanovlenie o sudebnoy praktike po delam o prestupleniyah, svyazannyh s narkoticheskimi sredstvami.” The Decree by the Plenum of the Supreme Court of Russian Federation №14. (2006). <https://rg.ru/2006/06/28/verhovny-sud.html>
- Saez, E. (2010). Do taxpayers bunch at kink points? *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, 2(3), 180–212. <https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.2.3.180>
- Sarang, A. (2017). Civil society and drugs in Russia: Moving towards the conservative agenda. *The Lancet*, 390(10102), 1621–1622. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736\(17\)32385-1](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(17)32385-1)
- Sarang, A., Knorre, A., & Litavrin, M. (2017). *The cost of freedom: An online survey about drug-related bribes to police in Russia*. <http://rylkov-fond.org/files/2017/11/tsena-svobody.pdf>
- Sarang, A., Rhodes, T., Sheon, N., & Page, K. (2010). Policing drug users in Russia: Risk, fear, and structural violence. *Substance Use & Misuse*, 45(6), 813–864. <https://doi.org/10.3109/10826081003590938>
- Shklyaruk, M., & Skougarevskiy, D. (2015). *Kriminal'naya statistika—cherez otkrytost' k upravlyaemosti* (Analiticheskie Zapiski Po Problemam Pravoprimeneniya, p. 24) [Crime statistics — through transparency to controllability (Policy memos on Law Enforcement Issues)]. Institute for the Rule of Law, European University at St. Petersburg. [http://enforce.spb.ru/images/foto/Crimestat\\_memo\\_2015\\_IRL\\_KGI\\_color.pdf](http://enforce.spb.ru/images/foto/Crimestat_memo_2015_IRL_KGI_color.pdf)
- Solomon, P. H. (2015). Post-Soviet criminal justice: The persistence of distorted neo-inquisitorialism. *Theoretical Criminology*, 19(2), 159–178. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1362480614568746>
- Stam, N. C., Gerostamoulos, D., Gerstner-Stevens, J., Scott, N., Smith, K., Drummer, O. H., & Pilgrim, J. L. (2018). Determining the effective dose of street-level heroin: A new way to consider fluctuations in heroin purity, mass and potential contribution to overdose. *Forensic Science International*, 290, 219–226. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.forsciint.2018.07.009>

- TalkingDrugs. (2019). *Drug decriminalisation across the world*. <https://www.talkingdrugs.org/drug-decriminalisation>
- Tuttle, C. (2017). *Bunching at punishment cliffs: Evidence from drug mandatory minimums*. <https://appam.confex.com/appam/sc18dc/webprogram/Paper24648.html>
- UNAIDS Data Book. (2018). 376. [https://www.unaids.org/sites/default/files/media\\_asset/un aids-data-2018\\_en.pdf](https://www.unaids.org/sites/default/files/media_asset/un aids-data-2018_en.pdf)
- World Prison Brief. (2018). *Russian Federation*. <http://www.prisonstudies.org/country/russian-federation>

### **Author Biography**

**Alex Knorre**, MA, is a doctoral student in the Department of Criminology at the University of Pennsylvania, and affiliated researcher at the Institute for the Rule of Law at the European University at Saint Petersburg. His primary research interests focus on drug policy, illegal drug markets, and crime in Russia.